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IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AND FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801:
A CONTINUING QUANDARY FOR FEDERAL COURTS*
David E. Seidelson**
How one feels about implied assertions being received in evidence over the
opposing litigant's hearsay objection is likely to reflect how one feels about the
efficacy of cross-examination. Also, how one feels about implied assertions
being received in evidence in a criminal prosecution over the defendant's hearsay
objection is likely to reflect how one feels about the prophylactic purpose of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.' In either instance, civil action or crim-
inal proceeding, receiving implied assertions as nonhearsay subjects the oppos-
ing litigant to the jeopardy of an adverse litigation impact without the opportuni-
ty of subjecting the declarant to contemporaneous cross-examination directed
toward disproving the basis for the assertion, demonstrating an intended meaning
of the assertion different from that suggested by the proponent, or in any other
meaningful way ameliorating or eliminating the adverse impact. Because I feel
rather strongly about the efficiency of cross-examination and the protective pur-
pose of the Confrontation Clause,2 I feel that implied assertions should not be
characterized as nonhearsay.
How does Federal Rule of Evidence 801' characterize implied assertions,
hearsay or nonhearsay? Well, I'm not sure that the Rule itself compels either
characterization. It says that " '[h]earsay' is a statement other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted."4 It provides that "[a] 'statement' is (1) an oral
or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the
person as an assertion."' By hypothesis, an implied assertion is an oral or written
assertion or conduct intended as an assertion. That would suggest that an
implied assertion is hearsay under Rule 801. But suppose the implied assertion
is offered to prove something other than the matter explicitly asserted. Is it then
nonhearsay under the Rule? I don't think the Rule answers that question.
* See David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Quandary for Federal
Courts, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 741 (1986).
** Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See David E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: From "Faded Parchment"
to Slough, 3 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 477 (1993) [hereinafter Faded Parchment]; David E. Seidelson, The
Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News and Some Bad News, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51
(1988) [hereinafter Bad News]; David E. Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 76 (1971).
3. FED. R. EVID. 801. All of the Federal Rules of Evidence and annotations thereto may be found in FED. R.
EVID. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-1103 (1984 and Supp. 1995).
4. FED. R. EVID. 80 1(c).
5. FED. R. EviD. 801(a).
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Certainly, the Advisory Committee's Note to the Rule provides an answer. The
Note states that "verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for
inferring something other than the matter asserted, [is] excluded from the defini-
tion of hearsay by the language of subdivision (c)."' Why? The Note analogizes
implied assertions with nonverbal conduct "offered as evidence that the person
acted as he did because of his belief in the existence of the condition sought to be
proved, from which belief the existence of the condition may be inferred."7
Although conceding that "this sequence is ... in effect an assertion of the exis-
tence of the condition and hence properly includable within the hearsay con-
cept[,]" 8 and that "[a]dmittedly evidence of this character is untested with respect
to the perception, memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor,...
the Advisory Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal in the
absence of an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on
hearsay grounds."9
I suppose one of the best known examples of such nonverbal conduct exists in
a hypothetical fashioned by the court in Wright v. Tatham.1" A sea captain, after
inspecting his vessel, placed his family on board and embarked. Subsequently,
the captain's conduct is offered in evidence to prove the seaworthiness of the ves-
sel. Obviously, the evidence is relevant for the purpose stated. The captain's
conduct is equivalent to an implied assertion by him that the ship was seaworthy.
And for that very reason, a common law court might have characterized the evi-
dence as hearsay." However, the Advisory Committee's Note characterizes the
evidence as nonhearsay. As noted above, the rationale offered by the Committee
is that, "in the absence of an intent to assert,'1 2 the "dangers" 13 arising from the
fact that the evidence "is untested with respect to the perception, memory, and
narration (or their equivalents) of the actor"14 "are minimal.""5
I confess that the rationale puzzles me, for several reasons. First, how does the
absence of an intent to assert signify that the captain's inspection of the vessel
(perception) was more careful and thorough than it would have been had the cap-
tain intended to assert that the vessel was seaworthy? Second, how does the
absence of an intent to assert signify that the captain's memory of what he
observed during the inspection was more accurate than it would have been had
the captain intended to assert that the ship was seaworthy? Finally, how does the
absence of an intent to assert signify that the implied assertion that the vessel
was seaworthy (narration or its equivalent) is more precise than it would have




10. See 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
11. See, e.g., id.
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been had the captain intended to assert that the vessel was seaworthy? The
Advisory Committee's Note provides no enlightenment.
But, notwithstanding the lack of persuasiveness of the Note's rationale (at least
to me), I am bound to accept the Committee's conclusion that such nonassertive
conduct is nonhearsay because that conclusion is compelled by the explicit lan-
guage of Rule 801. A "statement"16 is essential for the hearsay characterization.
And a "statement" is defined as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion."'" The hypothetical
sea captain's conduct involved no oral or written assertion and his conduct (let us
assume) was not intended by him as an assertion. Consequently, despite my puz-
zlement over the Committee's rationale, I feel compelled to accept the conclusion
imposed by the language of the Rule itself.
I feel no such compulsion, however, with regard to the Committee's conclusion
by analogy that assertive verbal conduct is nonhearsay if offered to prove some-
thing other than the matter asserted. The "[s]imilar considerations govern[ing]"''
the nonverbal conduct of the sea captain are certainly no more persuasive when
applied to assertive verbal conduct and, in my opinion, no explicit language in
the Rule compels that the latter be characterized as nonhearsay. The absence of
such explicit language in the Rule is itself suggestive of the absence of a con-
gressional intention to change the common law characterization. Had Congress
intended to effect such a basic change, it presumably would have done so by
clear language in the Rule itself rather than relying on a single sentence in the
Advisory Committee's Note drawing an analogy between nonverbal conduct (the
sea captain) and both nonassertive verbal conduct "and verbal conduct which is
assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter
asserted, also excluded from the definition of hearsay by the language of subdivi-
sion (c)."' 9 Such reliance would seem to be an unusual back-door approach to
effecting a basic change in evidence law, changing the characterization of verbal
assertive conduct from hearsay to nonhearsay.
How have the federal courts reacted to the problem? Once more, the answer is
somewhat ambiguous. In United States v. Zenni,2" the court's opinion begins:
"This prosecution for illegal bookmaking activities presents a classic problem in
the law of evidence, namely, whether implied assertions are hearsay."'" That
"classic problem" arose out of these facts:
While conducting a search of the premises of [one of] the defendant[s] ... pur-
suant to a lawful search warrant which authorized a search for evidence of
bookmaking activity, government agents answered the telephone several times.
The unknown callers stated directions for the placing of bets on various sporting
16. FED. R. Evm. 801(a).
17. Id.
18. FED. R. EvID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
19. Id.
20. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
21. Id. at 465 (footnote omitted).
1995]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW RE VIEW
events. The government proposes to introduce this evidence to show that the
callers believed that the premises were used in betting operations. The existence
of such belief tends to prove that they were so used. The defendants object on
the grounds of hearsay.22
Relying on Rule 801(a)23 and (c)24 and the Advisory Committee's Note,2" the
court concluded that such implied assertions were no longer hearsay, even
though "the prevailing common law view"2 would have treated the assertions as
hearsay and excluded them.
I confess that the Zenni conclusion troubles me for several reasons. The first
has already been noted: imputing to Congress the legislative intention of effect-
ing a basic change in evidence law through a single sentence in the Advisory
Committee's Note. Second, I am troubled by the reliability of the extrajudicial
assertions. Let's examine the real or hypothetical example of those assertions
offered by the court: " 'Put $2 to win on Paul Revere in the third at
Pimlico .... , "27 To the court that "utterance" 28 was "a direction and not an
assertion of any kind, and therefore [it] can be neither true nor false. ' 29 But sure-
ly that declaration is an (implied) assertion of the declarant's belief that (1) a
horse named Paul Revere (2) is entered in the third race (3) at Pimlico (4) on or
after the day of the call. Would the declaration be admissible to prove those
facts? The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule as set forth in Rule
803(3)31 provides in pertinent part: "A statement of the declarant's then existing
state of mind,.., but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed" is not excluded by the hearsay rule.3 1
Thus, the court-fashioned example would be admissible to prove the declar-
ant's belief of the four facts noted above, assuming such belief was relevant, but
it would not be admissible to prove the four facts believed. Why? Although the
declarant may be the world's foremost authority as to his own state of mind,
including his beliefs, he is not the world's foremost authority as to the horses
running in a particular race at a particular track on a particular day. Therefore, as
to any one or all of those facts, the declarant may have been mistaken.
Consequently, while the assertion may be entirely reliable as to declarant's belief,
it is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible to prove the four facts believed by
declarant. Or as the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803(3) asserts:
The exclusion of "statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered
or believed" is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule
22. Id. at 465.
23. FED. R. EvID. 801(a).
24. FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
25. FED. R. EvlD. 801 advisory committee's note.
26. United States v. Zenni, 492 F Supp. 464, 466 n.7 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
27. Id. at 466, n.7.
28. Id.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
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which would otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay
statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening or event which
produced the state of mind.32
Now let's engage in a little analogizing of our own. If the court-fashioned
example would not be admissible "to serve as the basis for an inference of the
happening or event which produced the state of mind[,]" ' 33 because of the decla-
ration's lack of reliability, why should that declaration be admissible to serve as
the basis for an inference that the anticipated auditor was a bookmaker? The
declarant could be mistaken about that "remembered or believed" 34 fact as well.
But the officers were prepared to testify to "several" 3 such phone calls. Does
the added number of such assertions eliminate the possibility of mistake? I think
not. I assume that a state of mind declaration under Rule 803(3) would remain
inadmissible to prove the existence of the fact remembered or believed even if
complemented by several other similar state of mind declarations by other
declarants. After all, each of the declarants, although expert as to his own state
of mind, could be mistaken about the facts collectively remembered or believed.
Could each of the "several" declarants in Zenni have been mistaken about his
implied assertion that the auditor was a bookmaker? I think so. Each could have
dialed incorrectly. Each could have been acting on the basis of incorrect extraju-
dicial declarations made to him by someone else. Each could have been an
acquaintance of the expected auditor who engaged in friendly no-money-
changes-hands betting with the anticipated auditor. Might cross-examination of
the several declarants have revealed any one of those or possibly other benign
explanations? Of course. That's what cross-examination is all about.
But given the court's conclusion that the extrajudicial declarations had been
transmogrified from hearsay to nonhearsay by Rule 801 and the Advisory
Committee's Note, the declarations were ruled admissible to inculpate the
accused in circumstances where he would have no opportunity to confront or
cross-examine the unknown declarants in the presence of the jury required to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That leads to the third reason
that Zenni troubles me: the Confrontation Clause. That constitutional protec-
tion, uniquely available to the accused, assures him the right "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."36 The Supreme Court has held that, in order to
avoid violating the Confrontation Clause when extrajudicial declarations are
offered against the accused, the prosecution must demonstrate the reliability of
the declarations, either because they fall within firmly rooted exceptions to the
hearsay rule or possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 7 We have
32. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
35. United States v. Zenni, 492 E Supp. 464, 465 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. Ohio v Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). For a critical examination of some of the Court's confrontation
clause opinions from Roberts through White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), see Faded Parchment and Bad
News, supra note 2.
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already noted the lack of reliability of the declarations in Zenni, a conclusion
corroborated by Rule 803(3). Can it be argued that, because the court concluded
that the declarations were nonhearsay, the Confrontation Clause is simply inap-
plicable? There is, I think, a serious flaw in such an argument. Zenni itself con-
cluded that, before enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, such implied
assertions would have been characterized as hearsay, thus presumably implicat-
ing the Confrontation Clause. Can a congressional enactment (even one accom-
panied by Advisory Committee's Notes) circumscribe the applicability of a con-
stitutional provision? I think not. The Constitution prescribes the permissible
modes of amendment38 and simple congressional enactment of a statute is not
one of those methods. Yet Zenni made no reference to the Confrontation Clause.
In United States v. Reynolds,39 the Third Circuit arrived at a result contrary to
that achieved by the district court in Zenni. In Reynolds, the United States Postal
Inspection Service solicited the cooperation of a photographic studio in identify-
ing and prosecuting those who stole checks from the mail.4" Subsequently, the
studio phoned the Service to report that two men in the studio "did not appear to
know... the name and number ... that they wanted put on the I.D."41 Three
postal inspectors were dispatched to the studio where they observed Parran and
Reynolds leaving the studio together "while conversing and looking at the photo
I.D. card."42 Reynolds entered a bank and unsuccessfully attempted to cash a
check. After leaving the bank, Reynolds was arrested by the postal inspectors.
According to the inspectors, after Reynolds' arrest and as Parran approached
Reynolds, Reynolds said to Parran, "I didn't tell them anything about you."43
Parran and Reynolds were indicted for conspiring to possess an unemployment
compensation check, knowing it to be stolen, and for conspiring to use the social
security number of the payee in an attempt to cash the check." Both were also
charged with the substantive offenses referred to in the conspiracy counts. 5
Reynolds pleaded guilty to the substantive counts. At their joint trial, Reynolds
was tried on the conspiracy counts and Parran as to all counts.46
Over Parran's objection, the district court permitted the postal inspectors to tes-
tify to Reynolds' alleged declaration to Parran, "I didn't tell them anything about
you."47 Both defendants were found guilty as to all the counts tried. Parran
appealed, asserting that permitting the postal inspectors' testimony as to
Reynolds' declaration constituted reversible error because the declaration was
hearsay and fell within no exception to the hearsay rule. The government argued
that because the declaration had been offered not to prove the matter expressly
38. U.S. CONST. art. V
39. 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983).
40. Id.
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asserted, that Reynolds had said nothing about Parran, but rather to prove the
matter impliedly asserted, that Parran was implicated in the scheme, the declara-
tion was not hearsay "under Rule 80 1 (c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.""
The Third Circuit wasn't having any. It found that the government's argument
ignore[d] what legal commentators have expressly recognized and what the
courts have implicitly recognized. That is, statements containing express
assertions may also contain implied assertions qualifying as hearsay and suscep-
tible to hearsay objections. This situation arises when the matter which the
declarant intends to assert is different from the matter to be proved, but the mat-
ter asserted, if true, is circumstantial evidence of the matter to be proved. In this
situation too, the statement is subject to a hearsay objection.49
In Zenni, the telephone declarations were express assertions of the declarants'
desires to place bets on particular participants in particular sporting events to be
held at particular places and at particular times. Those express assertions were
offered as circumstantial evidence of the matter to be proved, that the anticipated
auditor was a bookmaker. Thus, according to Reynolds and the "legal commen-
tators"50 therein cited, those telephone declarations would be "subject to a
hearsay objection."51
Reynolds, unlike Zenni, considered, in addition to the hearsay characterization
of the declaration offered against Parran, his Sixth Amendment right of con-
frontation. "Parran argue[d] that ... the admission into evidence against him of
the powerfully incriminating hearsay . . . violated his right to confrontation as
secured by the Sixth Amendment."52 The court agreed, finding that "[t]his is
especially true because the defendant was unable to dispel [the] prejudice by
cross-examination. The co-defendant [Reynolds] did not testify and could not be
compelled to testify at the joint trial." 3 Similarly, in Zenni, the accused was pre-
cluded from dispelling the prejudice arising from the telephone declarations
made by unidentified declarants. As between Zenni and Reynolds, the latter pre-
sents the more persuasive and realistic conclusion as to the proper characteriza-
tion of the extrajudicial declarations, at least to me with my strong feelings about
the efficacy of cross-examination and the prophylactic purpose of the
Confrontation Clause.
In United States v. McGlory,"4 four defendants were charged with conspiring to
commit drug-related offenses. Over the objections of three of the defendants, the
government had received in evidence "notes and scraps of paper seized from
McGlory's trash and his residences"55 and found to have been written by him.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 103.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 104.
53. Id. at 105.
54. 968 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1388 (1993) (defendant McGlory); 113 S. Ct. 627
(1992) (defendant Kulkovit); 113 S. Ct. 415 (1992) (defendant Cotton).
55. McGlory, 968 F.2d at 328.
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The trial court accepted the government's argument that the notes were not
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein and thus were not
hearsay.56 On appeal, the Third Circuit refuted that conclusion.
The notes and scraps of paper, as explained by a government witness, alluded
to various aspects of drug transactions and referred to the three defendants other
than McGlory. "Thus, the statements in the notes, although not technically asser-
tions by McGlory, were used to imply the guilt of the defendants."" Following
the decision in Reynolds, the court concluded "that statements containing express
assertions not offered for their truth may contain implied assertions that qualify
as hearsay because the truth of the implied assertions is at issue and relevant to
guilt."5 " In McGlory, as in Reynolds, the declarations were characterized as
hearsay because "the matter which the declarant intends to assert is different
from the matter to be proved, but the matter asserted, if true, is circumstantial
evidence of the matter to be proved."5 9 Ultimately, however, the court affirmed
the receipt in evidence of the hearsay declarations as co-conspirator declarations.
That, in turn, mooted any discussion of the Confrontation Clause. Nevertheless,
McGlory indicates that Reynolds is alive and well, at least in the Third Circuit.
But Zenni, too, has its adherents. In United States v. Long,6" Keith Long was
convicted of possessing in excess of five grams of cocaine base with intent to
distribute.6 The court admitted evidence showing that:
During the search of [co-defendant] Mayfield's apartment, the telephone rang,
and a police officer answered it. An unidentified female voice asked to speak
with "Keith." The officer replied that Keith was busy. The caller then asked if
Keith "still had any stuff." The officer asked the caller what she meant, and the
caller responded "a fifty." The officer said "yeah." The caller then asked
whether "Mike" could come around to pick up the "fifty." Again, the officer
answered yes.62
Long's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the telephone conversation as
hearsay was denied.63 On appeal, Long argued that the trial court had committed
reversible error.
64
Long's argument was straightforward. Although the unidentified caller uttered
a series of questions, rather than direct assertions, the thrust of those questions
was an implicit assertion of Long's drug dealing. Long contended that "it [was]
irrelevant that these alleged assertions were couched in question form, since the
questions plainly revealed assumptions that are the functional equivalent of direct
56. Id.
57. Id. at 332-33.
58. Id. at 332.
59. Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1983)).
60. 905 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990).
61. Id.
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assertions.... [T]he caller, through her questions, in effect asserted that 'Keith
ha[d] crack and s[old] it out of Mayfield's apartment.' "65 To me, the propriety of
that contention is self-apparent. To the court, it was not.
Conceding that Rule 801 does not define "assertion," the court went directly to
the Advisory Committee's Note, which stresses that "nothing is an assertion
unless intended to be one."6 The court stated:
The caller's words, thus, cannot be characterized as an "assertion," even an
implied one, unless the caller intended to make such an assertion....
With our inquiry focused on the intent of the caller, we have little trouble dis-
posing of Long's theory about implied assertions. Long has not provided any
evidence to suggest that the caller, through her questions, intended to assert that
he was involved in drug dealing. The caller may indeed have conveyed mes-
sages about Long through her questions, but any such messages were merely
incidental and not intentional."
So much for Long's argument. The fact that the questions impliedly asserted
Long's guilt, that is, constituted circumstantial evidence that he was dealing in
crack, was irrelevant. So too was the fact that Long had no opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine the unidentified declarant in the presence of the jury
required to determine Long's guilt or innocence. That, it seems to me, elevates
form over substance and, in the process, negates the Confrontation Clause. The
court's opinion makes me wonder how the court would rule in a prosecution for
murdering an Indian chief on an Indian reservation if the prosecution offered the
testimony of a police officer that an unidentified caller, phoning the defendant's
abode a week after the homicide, asked, "Has Keith killed any more Indian chiefs
lately?"
In United States v. Lewis,68 Lewis and Wade were convicted of drug trafficking
charges. Law enforcement officers intercepted a package containing "approxi-
mately 237 grams of crack cocaine."69 After "substituting paraffin wax for most
of the cocaine and resealing the package,"7 the officers had one officer, "dis-
guised as a postal carrier,"71 deliver the package "to the designated address.
72
Defendant Wade signed for the package. After discovering the contents of the
package, Wade "flushed the contents down the toilet"73 and, "visibly upset,"74
made a long distance telephone call. Wade's second call was to defendant Lewis,
who arrived at the premises shortly thereafter. Both were arrested as they
attempted to leave. The court noted that:
65. Id.
66. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
67. United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579-80 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990) (footnote
omitted) (citing United States v. Zenni, 492 F Supp. 464, 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980)).
68. 902 E2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990).
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At the time of their arrest, each appellant had in his possession an electronic
pager or "beeper." These pagers were seized by the . . . [p]olice. Later that
day, at the police station, the pager associated with Lewis began beeping.
Officer Jerry Price called the number displayed on the pager and identified him-
self as Lewis. The person on the other end asked Price "Did you get the stuff?"
Price answered affirmatively. The unidentified person then asked "Where is
Dog?" Price responded that "Dog" was not available. [Price] then tried to
arrange a meeting with the unknown caller, but no one showed up at the
appointed rendezvous. The evidence at trial revealed that "Dog" is Wade's nick-
name.
75
On appeal, both defendants asserted that the testimony of Price should have
been excluded as hearsay under Rule 802.7' The appellate court rejected the
argument, concluding that "the questions asked by the unknown caller were not
'statements' within the definition of hearsay."7 7 Noting that the "Federal Rules of
Evidence define hearsay 'as a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted,' "78 and that a" 'statement' is then defined as an oral or writ-
ten assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion, ' 79 the appellate court
conceded that " 'assertion' is not defined in the rule."8 However, citing
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, the court stated that "the term has
the connotation of a positive declaration."'" To the court, that was dispositive.
Since the "questions asked by the unknown caller . . . were not intended to[ ]
assert anything,"8 2 they were not hearsay. The appellants' argued that:
while the questions ... are not direct assertions, there are certain assertions
implicit in the questions. For example, they argue that implicit in the question
"Did you get the stuff?." is an assertion that Lewis and/or Wade were expecting
to receive some "stuff." However, Rule 801, through its definition of statement,
forecloses appellants' argument by removing implied assertions from the cover-
age of the hearsay rule. Accordingly, we conclude that because the questions
asked by the unknown caller were not assertions, the questions were not hearsay,
and the district court properly allowed Officer Price to repeat them in his testi-
mony.
83
Among the authorities cited in the above quoted excerpt is Zenni. But even the
court in Zenni felt compelled to invoke the Advisory Committee's Note to sustain








83. Id. (citations omitted).
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the conclusion that implied assertions had been removed from the coverage of
the hearsay rule;8 4 Rule 801 does not in itself compel that conclusion.
It seems to me that the question, "Did you get the stuff?" is in every rational
respect simply another way of asserting, "I want to know if you got the stuff." To
attempt to distinguish between that question and that assertion is to engage in a
fool's errand. One is the equivalent of the other. The fact that one ends in a
question mark and the other with a period can hardly be dispositive of either's
being characterized as hearsay. Almost equally clearly, the assertion "I want to
know if you got the stuff" or the question "Did you get the stuff?" is being
offered as circumstantial evidence that the anticipated auditor was expecting to
receive some "stuff." Evidentiary rules deal with practicalities not with lexicog-
raphers' conundrums. But Zenni inexorably leads courts toward the latter. And,
like Zenni, Lewis permitted the accused to be inculpated by extrajudicial declara-
tions absent the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the declarant in the
presence of the jury.
In United States v. Groce,8" Groce and Chisholm were convicted of conspiracy
and substantive counts of importing marijuana into the United States.8" When
the fishing vessel on which the two defendants were apprehended was searched,
"officials found a partially unfolded navigation chart indicating the southwestern
coast of Florida[,] . . . [a]nother chart, [and] two spiral notebooks."87 At trial,
government expert Barrett "trace[d] the route of the [fishing vessel] on the basis
of pencil markings (fixes) appearing on the chart."88 He testified that "the vessel
traveled from southern Florida into the Caribbean and was heading back to
northern Florida."89 Defendants' objection that the pencil markings constituted
hearsay was rejected at trial and on appeal. The appellate court said: "The test
[under Rule 801 (a)(1),(c)] ... is whether Chisholm or Groce intended the marks
to represent some statement of their intent to return to the United States."9
The appellate court apparently answered that question no, relying in part on the
government's "analogy between the marks on the chart and footprints."9 1 "Under
this theory, Chisholm and Groce marked the chart to indicate their precise loca-
tion so they would not get lost at sea. By simply noting their current location,
defendants made no assertion about their intent to return to the United States. 92
If that was the case, how did the government's expert witness, Barrett, know that
the vessel "was heading back to northern Florida?"9 3 Either the markings on the
chart manifested the defendants' intent to return to the United States or the gov-
84. United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp 464, 466 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
85. 682 E2d 1359 (11 th Cir. 1982).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1361.
88. Id. at 1363.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1364.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1363.
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ernment's expert was a clairvoyant. Then to compound the confusion, the appel-
late court said:
On the other hand, if Chisholm and Groce sat down and plotted their course and
intended to express their intent to return to the United States, the marks could be
viewed as assertions; however, such assertions still would be admissible as a
coconspirator's statement in furtherance of the conspiracy, regardless of which
defendant actually plotted the course.94
That's a pretty slick segue, perhaps too slick by half. There was only one set of
marks under judicial scrutiny and from those marks Barrett was able to testify
that the defendants intended to return to northern Florida. Apparently, Barrett
found the marks assertive. To conclude judicially that the marks did not consti-
tute a "statement" for the purpose of 801(a) or (c) makes Barrett's expert testi-
mony virtually inexplicable; to find that those same marks did constitute a "state-
ment" for the purpose of 801(d)(2)(E), 95 "a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy,"9 seems almost
disingenuous.
Is there any instance in which an implied assertion can logically and properly
be characterized as nonhearsay when "offered as a basis for inferring something
other than the matter asserted?"97 I think the answer is yes if there is a substan-
tial disparity between the express assertion and the matter to be inferred from it.
But I also believe that such a disparity will almost invariably create an insur-
mountable problem of relevance. With the reader's indulgence, I would like to
utilize a hypothetical case much of which I have used before. 8
A wrongful death action is brought against defendant Dean. His car struck and
killed plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiff alleges that Dean was driving while intoxi-
cated. In his case-in-chief, plaintiff presents evidence that, prior to the fatal
impact, Dean had been at a party where booze was served and that Dean had
ingested some of the booze. Plaintiff also presents evidence that Dean had dri-
ven Jones to the party. Then plaintiff calls Williams to the stand. Williams offers
to testify that, shortly before Dean left the party, Dean said to Williams, "Tell
Jones I'm ready to leave and I'll drive him home." When Williams gave Jones
the message, Jones replied, "I'd rather walk home than ride with Dean. He's
stinking drunk."
Obviously, defense counsel will assert a hearsay objection to the offered testi-
mony of Jones' reply and almost certainly that objection will be sustained.
Plaintiff is offering the extrajudicial declaration of Jones to prove the truth of the
matter asserted therein. The same result would ensue if Jones' reply had been,
94. Id. at 1364.
95. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E).
96. Id.
97. FED. R. EviD. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
98. See David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Quandary for Federal
Courts, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 741, 760 (1986).
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"I'd rather walk home than ride with Dean. He's three sheets to the wind." That
amended declaration is simply a colloquial manner of asserting that Dean is
drunk. There is no significant disparity between express assertion and the matter
to be inferred therefrom.
Let's widen the disparity between assertion and inference. Suppose Williams
offers to testify that Jones' response was, "I'd rather crawl home on my hands
and knees." Now how should the court react to defendant's hearsay objection?
The widened disparity between assertion and inference (intoxication) may tilt the
court toward overruling the objection. But that same widened disparity simulta-
neously raises a question of relevance. Defense counsel might well object on the
grounds that the offered testimony is irrelevant with regard to Dean's sobriety or
intoxication. It is possible, I suppose, that the court could c6nclude that, given
the rather dramatic nature of his response, Jones intended to assert that Dean was
drunk. That would certainly lead the court to overrule defendant's irrelevance
objection. But would it not for the very same reason (Jones' intent to assert that
Dean was drunk) compel the court to characterize the declaration as hearsay and
sustain that objection?
Let's fashion one more variation of the offered testimony. Suppose Williams
offers to testify that Jones' response was, "Tell Dean 'no thanks.' I'll call a cab,"
and that Jones immediately phoned for a cab. Suppose too that plaintiff offers
evidence that cab fare from the party site to Jones' home was forty dollars.
Defense counsel objects that the offered testimony is irrelevant. How should the
court rule? Because, on its face, this latter response is less dramatic than the pre-
ceding "crawl" declaration, the court might be inclined to sustain the objection,
concluding that no reasonable jury could infer that Dean was intoxicated from
the "cab" response. But the "crawl" response was more rhetoric than fact,
whereas forty dollars is forty dollars. Perhaps the cab response is just as dramat-
ic as the crawl response. If so, should the irrelevance objection be overruled and,
as with the crawl response, the hearsay objection sustained? What's a poor judge
to do? According to the Advisory Committee's Note, the problem poses no great
difficulty:
When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory that it is not a statement,
and hence not hearsay, a preliminary determination will be required to deter-
mine whether an assertion is intended. The rule is so worded as to place the
burden upon the party claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubt-
ful cases will be resolved against him and in favor of admissibility. The deter-
mination involves no greater difficulty than many other preliminary questions of
fact.99
It is relatively easy to say that determining whether or not Jones intended to
make an assertion is no more difficult than other preliminary questions of fact.
99. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
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But without Jones on the stand, how is the court to perform that feat? And I
think it is safe to assume that Jones is unavailable or plaintiff's counsel would
have put Jones on the stand (or the court would have insisted that Jones be put on
the stand) to testify as to his lay opinion as to Dean's sobriety or intoxication."0
Without the unavailable Jones, I don't think the court or anyone else can make an
intelligent determination as to Jones' intention.
Does that mean, as the Advisory Committee's Note states, that the burden of
proving Jones' intention to make an assertion is on the defendant and if the issue
remains "ambiguous and doubtful"'01 that it should be resolved against him and
in favor of admissibility? That seems inherently unfair to the party asserting the
hearsay declaration. In our hypothetical, the defendant has no greater capacity
than the plaintiff (or the court) to discern and prove Jones' intention at the time
he made the declaration. Also, does the Advisory Committee's Note's resolution
really apply to our hypothetical, wherein it is clear that Jones made some asser-
tion (as opposed to having only engaged in some "conduct") and that the ques-
tion is whether there is sufficient disparity between assertion and inference to
characterize the assertion as nonhearsay? And if such disparity does exist, does
the assertion become irrelevant?
For all plaintiff, defendant, and court know, neither of Jones' last two respons-
es, "crawl" or "cab," were directed at all to Dean's sobriety or intoxication.
When Dean drove Jones to the party, Dean may (unknowingly) have said or done
something that so offended Jones that he would not again ride with Dean. Or,
after the two arrived at the party, Dean (unknowingly) may have said or done
something that so offended Jones that he would not again ride with Dean. Given
Jones' unavailability, how is the court to determine the real basis for Jones' moti-
vation for taking an expensive cab ride home and, therefore, his intention in say-
ing what he said and doing what he did? And is not that problem equally great
with regard to Jones' "crawl" declaration? If the court cannot determine Jones'
motivation in either instance, how can the court intelligently rule on the rele-
vance of either of Jones' responses. I don't think it can.
If that is the situation, the Advisory Committee's Note confronts the federal
courts with a quandary. In every instance in which an extrajudicial declaration is
offered to prove an inference arising therefrom, there must be a substantial dis-
parity between assertion and inference to justify characterizing the former as
nonhearsay. And in almost every case where such a substantial disparity exists,
that very disparity will raise a relevance issue that the litigants and the court will
find impossible to resolve rationally. Given that quandary created by the
100. Rule 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or infer-
ences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of
the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of
a fact in issue.
FED. R. EviD. 701.
101. FED. R. Evm. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
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Advisory Committee's Note and the fact that the language of Rule 801 itself does
not compel the conclusion that the Note would achieve, I believe the federal
courts should conclude that implied assertions retain their common law status as
hearsay, admissible only if they satisfy one of the specific exceptions to the
hearsay rule" 2 or one of the residual exceptions.
10 3
How have our British cousins, unencumbered by the Advisory Committee's
Note, resolved the issue? From Wright v. Tatham'0 4 to Regina v. Kearley'0 they
have characterized implied assertions as hearsay. In Wright, testator, Marsden,
left his estate to Wright, former steward of Marsden. Admiral Tatham, Marsden's
heir at law, challenged the will, asserting that Marsden had lacked testamentary
capacity. Counsel for Wright offered in evidence six letters which had been writ-
ten to Marsden. Each writer had known Marsden and each was dead at the time
of trial. The letters dealt with a mix of personal and business matters.
Because each of the declarants had known Marsden, each presumably would
have been competent to offer a lay opinion as to Marsden's competence.'
0 6
Clearly, such opinions would have been relevant to Marsden's mental capacity.10 7
But what made the letters relevant? Each was an implied assertion by its author
that Marsden was mentally competent. And, of course, that created the hearsay
problem. If each letter was an extrajudicial declaration offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter impliedly asserted therein, was not each letter
hearsay? The House of Lords said yes.
The Advisory Committee's Note says no. Why the difference? The Note states
that "similar considerations" ' 8 apply to "verbal conduct which is assertive but
offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted ' 10 9 (the
letter in Wright) as apply to "nonverbal conduct"1 (the sea captain's inspection
of his ship and subsequent embarkation with his family). As we have already
noted, those "considerations" are (1) the "dangers"1 1 of "untested ... perception,
memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor"1 2 which were "mini-
mal in the absence of an intent to assert" '113 and (2) that the "likelihood
1 4 of
"fabrication"' 15 "is less" '116 and "questions of sincerity""1 7 are "virtually eliminat-
102. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) to (23); FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) to (b)(4).
103. FED. R. EViD. 803(24); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
104. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
105. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
106. FED. R. EvID. 701.
107. " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence." FED. R. EvD. 401.
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ed"'1 "in the absence of an intent to assert.""' 9 We have noted that those consid-
erations do little or nothing to enhance the perception, memory, or narration of
the sea captain. How, if at all, would they affect the perception, memory, or nar-
ration of the letter writers in Wright?
With or without an intent to assert Marsden's competence, each author's
knowledge of and familiarity with Marsden and his mental capacity would have
been precisely the same. With or without an intent to assert Marsden's compe-
tence, each author's memory of his perceptions would have been the same. The
implied assertion that Marsden was competent would have been no more precise
than it would have been had the author intended to assert the same conclusion.
Rather, an intent to assert that conclusion, or an explicit assertion of that conclu-
sion, would if anything strengthen the precision of the narration. Because the
letters were written ante litem motam, the likelihood of fabrication or sincerity
would seem to be about the same whether or not the authors had intended to
assert that Marsden was competent.
All in all, perception, memory, narration "(or their equivalents)"' 20 and sinceri-
ty on the part of the authors of the letters would appear to be of pretty much the
same level with or without an intention to assert Marsden's competence. The
absence of such an intention seems to have had no significant beneficial effect
on any of those factors. Consequently, the Advisory Committee's Note's conclu-
sion that such "verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for infer-
ring something other than the matter asserted"'' be characterized as nonhearsay
is not very persuasive. Earlier, we found the "similar considerations"'22 offered
in support of the Note's nonhearsay characterization of "nonverbal conduct"' 23
(the sea captain) unpersuasive but compelled by the language of Rule 801. With
regard to "verbal conduct"' 24 (the Wright letters) the Note's nonhearsay charac-
terization is neither persuasive nor compelled by the language of the Rule. To
me, that suggests that federal courts should follow the conclusion achieved in
Wright rather than the conclusion found in the Note.
In Regina v. Kearley,25 defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
drug with intent to supply. After the defendant's arrest, "police officers remained
on the premises for several hours."' 26 During that time, the officers received fif-
teen telephone calls and nine personal visitors.'27 Ten of the telephone callers
and seven of the visitors (some of whom had earlier phoned) sought to purchase








125. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
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the court permitted the officers to testify to the phone calls and visits. 29 The
defendant was convicted and the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal.13 The
House of Lords, dividing 3-2, allowed the appeal, concluding that the trial court
had erred in receiving the officers' testimony.13 1
Those Lords allowing the appeal recognized two possible evidentiary uses for
the extrajudicial declarations offered: (1) to prove the state of mind of the
declarants and (2) to invite the factfinder to infer from the declarations that
defendant had supplied the declarants with drugs in the past. 32 The first use was
found irrelevant.13 3 The second, though relevant, was precluded by the hearsay
rule. "'34 The implied assertions that defendant had supplied drugs were extrajudi-
cial declarations relevant only to prove the truth of the matter impliedly asserted
therein and, therefore, were governed by Wright and subsequent decisions of the
House of Lords.
Lord Bridge of Harwich stated the problem succinctly:
The first question ... is whether the fact of the request for drugs having been
made is in itself relevant to the issue whether the defendant was a supplier. The
fact that words were spoken may be relevant for various purposes, but most
commonly they will be so when they reveal the state of mind of either the
speaker or the person to whom the words were spoken when that state of mind is
itself in issue or is relevant to a matter in issue. The state of mind of the person
making the request for drugs is of no relevance at all to the question whether the
defendant is a supplier. The sole possible relevance of the words spoken is that
by manifesting the speaker's belief that the defendant is a supplier they implied-
ly assert that fact. This is most clearly exemplified by two of the requests made
to police officers in the instant case by callers requesting drugs from the defen-
dant where the speaker asked for a supply of his "usual amount." The speaker
was impliedly asserting that he had been supplied by the defendant with drugs
in the past. If the speaker had expressly said to the police officer that the defen-
dant had supplied him with drugs in the past, this would clearly have been inad-
missible as hearsay. When the only relevance of the words spoken lies in their
implied assertion that the defendant is a supplier of drugs, must this equally be
excluded as hearsay? ... Is a distinction to be drawn for the purposes of the
hearsay rule between express and implied assertions?1
35
His resolution was equally succinct:
The answer to the question given by the English authorities is clear and
unequivocal. In Wright v. Doe d. Tatham,. . . letters written to a deceased testa-
tor by persons who could not be called to give evidence which clearly implied
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 228.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 253.
134. Id. at 255.
135. Id. at 243.
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the writers' belief in the addressee's sanity were held unanimously by the Court
of King's Bench, in a single judgment delivered by Lord Denman C.J., and by
the six judges in the Exchequer Chamber to be, per se, inadmissible ... on the
issue of the testator's testamentary capacity.
1 3 6
And that respected authority was complemented by a more recent judgment:
[T]he [more] recent decision of your Lordships' House in Reg. v. Blastland
[1986] .. . clearly affirms the proposition that evidence of words spoken by a
person not called as a witness which are said to assert a relevant fact by neces-
sary implication are inadmissible as hearsay just as evidence of an express state-
ment made by the speaker asserting the same fact would be. 3 7
And what of Zenni's interpretation of Rule 801 and the Advisory Committee's
Note thereto regarding implied assertions? It was stated that:
The judge's statement that the Federal Rules of Evidence "expressly" abolished
the common law rule that implied assertions should be treated as hearsay may,
perhaps, be putting the case too high, but I do not question his conclusion that
on their true construction the relevant Federal Rules lead to that result.
138
Appropriately politic.
Lord Ackner's opinion nicely complements the above opinion in regard to both
relevance and hearsay:
An oral request or requests for drugs to be supplied by the defendant, not spo-
ken in his presence or in his hearing, could only be evidence of the state of mind
of the person or persons making the request, and since his or their state of mind
was not a relevant issue at the trial, evidence of such a request or requests, how-
ever given, would be irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. The jury would not
be entitled to infer from the fact that the request(s) was made, that the appellant
was a supplier of drugs.
. The evidence is not admissible because it is irrelevant. It is as simple as
that. But in case I have been guilty of over-simplification, let me consider the
position upon the assumption that the very nature of the request or requests car-
ries with it a permissible implication that the appellant was a supplier of drugs.
It is only in such a situation that the request, spoken not in the appellant's pres-
ence or hearing and by a person not called as a witness, that the rule against the
admission of hearsay evidence falls to be considered.
[The Crown] frankly concedes that if the inquirer had said in the course of
making his request "I would like my usual supply of amphetamine at the price
which I paid you last week" or words to that effect, then although the inquirer
could have been called to give evidence of the fact that he had in the past pur-
chased from the appellant his requirement of amphetamine and had made his
136. Id. at 243-44.
137. Id. at 245.
138. Id. at 249.
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call at the appellant's house for a further supply on the occasion when he met
and spoke to the police, the hearsay rule prevents the prosecution from calling
police officers to recount the conversation which I have described. This is for
the simple reason that the request made in the form set out above contains an
express assertion that the premises at which the request was being made was
being used as a source of supply of drugs and the supplier was the appellant.
If, contrary to the view which I have expressed above, the simple request or
requests for drugs to be supplied by the appellant, as recounted by the police,
contains in substance, but only by implication, the same assertion, then I can
find neither authority nor principle to suggest that the hearsay rule should not be
equally applicable and exclude such evidence. What is sought to be done is to
use the oral assertion, even though it may be an implied assertion, as evidence
of the proposition asserted. That the proposition is asserted by way of necessary
implication rather than expressly cannot, to my mind, make any difference.
139
Precisely. If the assertion is not offered to prove the truth of the matter expressly
or impliedly asserted therein, but only to prove the declarant's state of mind, the
assertion is relevant only if the declarant's state of mind is relevant. If that state
of mind is irrelevant, then so too is the assertion. On the other hand, if the asser-
tion is offered to prove the truth of the matter impliedly asserted therein and the
assertion would be excluded by the hearsay rule to prove the truth of the same
matter expressly asserted therein, the implied assertion should also be excluded.
To decide otherwise would be to elevate form over substance and amorphous
rules of grammar over the realities of the litigation process.
Of course, the House of Lords in Kearley was uninhibited by Rule 801 and the
Advisory Committee's Note thereto. Thus, Lord Ackner was free to conclude
that "neither authority nor principle""14 justified admitting the implied assertion
when the express assertion would be excluded by the hearsay rule. But how
should the Supreme Court of the United States resolve the issue when the appro-
priate case is before the Court? Zenni concluded that the Rule and the Note
effected a change in the pre-existing common law which would have character-
ized the implied assertion as hearsay. Finding such a dramatic change, Zenni
found the implied assertions nonhearsay. In Tome v. United States,'4' the Court
held that, under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), 42 prior consistent statements were substan-
tively admissible after the witness' credibility had been impeached by a showing
of improper motive only where the prior statements antedated the improper
motive. Justice Kennedy wrote: "A party contending that legislative action
changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such
a change."' 43
139. Id. at 254-55.
140. Id. at 255.
141. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
142. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B).
143. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 704 (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989) (applying
that presumption in interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 609)).
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That language suggests that the Zenni result might encounter tough going
before the Court. But Justice Kennedy also wrote: "Our conclusion ... is con-
firmed by an examination of the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules
of Evidence. We have relied on those well-considered Notes as a useful guide in
ascertaining the meaning of the Rules."144 That language suggests approval of
Zenni's reliance on the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801. And immediate-
ly after that language, Justice Kennedy wrote: "Where .. .Congress did not
amend the Advisory Committee's draft in any way.., the Committee's commen-
tary is particularly relevant in determining the meaning of the document
Congress enacted."' 45
In fact, Congress did amend Rule 801 as proposed by the Advisory
Committee.146 Moreover, each of the above quoted excerpts from Justice
Kennedy's opinion was concurred in by only three other members of the Court. 47
Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the result but disagreeing
with the suggested reliance on the Advisory Committee's Note: "I have previ-
ously acquiesced in .. .and indeed myself engaged in .. .similar use of the
Advisory Committee Notes. More mature consideration has persuaded me that
is wrong .... [Tjhe Notes cannot, by some power inherent in the draftsmen,
change the meaning that the Rule would otherwise bear." '148 Consequently, like
so much else about Rule 801 and its treatment of implied assertions, how the
Court would react to the alleged change in pre-existing law and the weight the
Court would give the Advisory Committee's Note seem ambiguous.
Yet, if Congress had intended such a dramatic change in pre-existing law, pre-
sumably the Rule enacted by Congress would have explicitly characterized
implied assertions as nonhearsay. It does not. The fact that the Rule does explic-
itly treat nonverbal conduct not intended to be assertive as nonhearsay seems to
make it all the more unlikely that Congress would not similarly have treated
implied assertions had Congress intended the same result. Moreover, given that
lacuna in the Rule itself, one would expect the House or Senate Judiciary
Committee Report to reveal an intention to change pre-existing law. Neither
does. In fact, neither Report makes any reference to the meaning to be attributed
to the language of Rule 801(a) or (c). 149
Consequently, I think the Court should conclude that implied assertions remain
hearsay under Rule 801, thereby giving effect to the apparent congressional
144. Id. at 702.
145. Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, at 165-66 n.9 (1988)).
146. See Rule 801, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, March 1969.
147. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 698. The three concurring were Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.
148. Id. at 706.
149. The House Report contains comments on Rule 801 commencing with 801(d)(1). H.R. REP. No. 650,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7076. The Senate Report contains com-
ments on Rule 801 commencing with 801(d)(1)(A). S. Ra. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7062.
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intent and precluding the Advisory Committee from perverting that intent by a
perfunctory effort to analogize implied assertions with nonassertive conduct.
And, not just coincidentally, that conclusion would help preserve the efficacy of




THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE HEARSAY DOCTRINE:
A RESPONSE To PROFESSOR SEIDELSON
I. PREFACE
This Comment will examine Professor Seidelson's account of implied hearsay.1
I would agree with his normative thesis if it were explicitly confined to evidence
offered by the prosecution against the accused. But I disagree with the reasons
supporting his thesis.
II. THE DANGERS-BASED MODEL OF HEARSAY
Like many others, Professor Seidelson favors this model over its competitors.2
Based on an uncompromisingly functional understanding of the hearsay
doctrine,3 this model treats the following types of out-of-court evidence as identi-
cally dangerous:
(a) an intentionally assertive act (utterances included), when offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted;
(b) a course of conduct, when offered to prove the existence of some of its back-
ground conditions;
(c) an utterance, when offered to prove the truth of its inferential implications.
In each of these cases, no inferential progress can be made without relying on
the declarant's observation, memory, sincerity, and communicative efficacy. The
familiar testimonial risks, namely, the possibility of misperception, faulty memo-
ry, insincerity, and ambiguity, thus come into play. These risks need to be coun-
teracted by effective cross-examination; evidence that cannot be examined in this
way is hearsay and should, in principle, be excluded.
* Visiting Professor, University of Miami School of Law, 1994-95; Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. LL.B., 1983; LL.M., 1987, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Ph.D., 1990, University
of London. Comments received from Brooks R. Fudenberg and Alon Harel are gratefully acknowledged.
1. See David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Continuing Quandary
for Federal Courts, 16 MIss. C. L. REv. 33 (1995).
2. For a discussion of other models, see Craig R. Callen, Foreword to the First Virtual Forum: Wallace
Stevens, Blackbirds and the Hearsay Rule, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 1 (1995). In what follows, I shall propose
another model which I believe to be preferable.
3. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv.
177 (1948). More refined analyses can be found in Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 957 (1974); Roger C. Park, McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis
Followed by Suggestions to Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L. REv. 423 (1981); Michael H. Graham, "Stickperson
Hearsay": A Simplified Approach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 887; and in
Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667 (1987).
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Professor Seidelson adopts this model subject to a minor reservation;4 and he
uses it as a baseline for criticizing a number of decisions made by American
courts.' In each of these decisions, which applied Federal Rule of Evidence 801,
evidence of type (c) was held to be non-hearsay. Professor Seidelson argues that
this approach misinterprets Rule 801; and he also criticizes it for elevating form
over substance.6
Intrigued by the normative aspects of the problem more than by positive law, I
shall examine the latter point only. I shall argue that the dangers-based and other
familiar hearsay models are inadequate and shall propose to replace them with a
risk-allocating model.
III. FORM VS. SUBSTANCE
According to Professor Seidelson, elevation of form over substance is a bad
thing in the present context. I think that this argument is misdirected; the form
versus substance problem is, in fact, one of the key issues this Symposium needs
-to address. If the policies underlying the hearsay doctrine were to be carried to
their logical extreme, regardless* of decisional rectitude that needs to be promoted
through admission of potentially credible evidence, the definition of hearsay
would become over-inclusive. The doctrine would consequently become over-
exclusionary; the domain of the provable would be narrowed down most substan-
4. According to Professor Seidelson, an assertion would not amount to hearsay if there is a substantial dis-
parity between its explicit contents and the matter to be inferred from them. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 44-45.
But he also believes that in such cases the assertion would be irrelevant. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 45-46. He
exemplifies this by a statement "Tell Dean 'no thanks.' I'll call a cab," made by a person in response to Dean's
invitation to drive him home from a party involving boozing, and offered to prove that Dean later drove his car
while intoxicated. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 45. 1 think that this argument is flawed. Under Bayes' theorem,
which can explain the relevancy notion correspondingly to Rule 401,
P(H/E) = P(H) x P(E/H)/P(E),
when H signifies the litigated event and E stands for a piece of evidence offered to establish H. E would thus
be irrelevant only when P(E/H) and P(E) are known to be equal. See Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance,
75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977). This irrelevancy condition was not satisfied under Professor Seidelson's own
terms. His argument about irrelevancy would be correct only in trivial and thus uninteresting cases. He would
not do better by arguing that the statement should be excluded under Rule 403 because its probativity is too
conjectural. The latter is conjectural because the statement entails ambiguity, which could be dispelled if the
declarant were cross-examinable as a witness. Presence of this hearsay danger as a main reason for excluding
the statement reduces this argument to semantics.
5. Namely, United States v. Zenni, 492 F Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980), and its like.
6. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 41.
7. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 41.
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tially and the trial process would frequently (if not systematically) fail to produce
correct decisions.
8
I agree with Professor Seidelson that Regina v. Kearley9 was correctly decided;
and I also agree with him that American courts, in dealing with criminal accusa-
tions, should have arrived at the same conclusion." Alan Kearley might have
attracted the drug-seekers who called to and attended his apartment not because
he was actually selling drugs. Drug-selling might have been attributed to him by
an underworld rumor. Cross-examination of the drug-seekers was therefore a
conditio sine qua non to the ascertainment of the truth." This, however, would
not be true about all cases involving implied assertions. For example: W testi-
fies that she saw the accused greeted by D; should this testimony be excluded as
hearsay if offered to prove acquaintance between D and the accused? I think it
should not and believe that most people would agree with me. W's testimony
would, however, be inadmissible under the over-inclusive definition of hearsay.
To avoid over-inclusiveness, any attempt at formalizing the dangers-based
model as a strict rule should thus be abandoned.12 Instead, this model would
have to be formalized and applied as a standard.13 As such, it would require
judges to exclude evidence presenting serious hearsay dangers; evidence not pre-
senting such dangers would have to be admitted. Evidential admissibility would
thus be determined by individualized case-by-case judgments. Costs involved in
8. See Stephen Guest, Hearsay Revisited, 1988 CuRR. LEG. PROB. 33. See also Margaret A. Berger, How
Would or Should the Supreme Court Interpret the Definitions in Rule 801?, 16 Miss. C. L. REV. 13 (1995).
Limited to evidence belonging to type (a) above, the explicitness-based model is, in contrast, under-inclu-
sive. This explains the existence of other models which attempt to bridge the gap opened by the previous two.
These other models include:
(a) the Communicative Intention-Based Model that captures all conventionally communicated infor-
mation, i.e., more than matters directly intended to be asserted. This model has much to offer. See
Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 43 (1994); and
(b) the Necessary Implications Model that captures not just matters directly intended to be asserted,
but also their logical entailments. See Eustace Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26
HARV. L. REv. 146, 150-51 n.13 (1912). This model is not devoid of problems: see, e.g., Olin Guy
Wellborn III, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEX. L. REv. 49, 75-81
(1982).
The Necessary Implications Model has recently been advocated as original; evidence scholarship has also
been criticized by the author for failing to sufficiently recognize that "there is no single relation of implication
between an expression or action and the proposition 'implied.' " To verify the unbelievable, see Andrew Rein,
The Scope of Hearsay, 110 LAW QuAR. REv. 431, 435, 443 (1994).
9. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
10. This approach certainly cannot be ruled out as doctrinally impossible under Rule 801.
11. But not according to J.R. Spencer, Hearsay, Relevance and Implied Assertions, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 40
(1993); and Ronald J. Allen, Rules, Logic, and Judgment, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 61, 65 (1995).
Another reason for the necessity of cross-examination was nicely spelled out by Lord Ackner:
Professor Cross . . . stated that a further reason justifying the hearsay rule was the danger that
hearsay evidence might be concocted. He dismissed this as "simply one aspect of the great patho-
logical dread of manufactured evidence which beset English lawyers of the late 18th and early 19th
centuries." Some recent appeals, well known to your Lordships, regretfully demonstrate that cur-
rently that anxiety, rather than being unnecessarily morbid, is fully justified.
Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 258.
12. See, e.g., Roger C. Park, The Definition of Hearsay: To Each Its Own, 16 Miss. C. L. RE. 125 (1995).
13. A good discussion of the features of rules, as contrasted with those of standards, can be found in MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STuDEs ch. 1(1987).
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this standard's enforcement would be patently high. They would include more
than the litigation and decision-making expenses at both trial and appellate lev-
els. As the discretionary dangers-based standard is likely to be applied different-
ly by different judges, these costs would also include the expenses incurred by
new trials brought about by disagreements between trial and appellate courts.
That form matters (and may, indeed, be elevated over substance) can now
clearly be seen. Formalizable only as a standard, the dangers-based model may
justifiably be abandoned in favor of the explicitness-based model because its
enforcement would be too costly. Formalizable as a rule, and thus straightfor-
wardly applicable in a large number of cases, the explicitness-based model would
incur only minimal enforcement costs.14 Part of this saving may, of course, be
offset by the savings generated by exclusion of the evidence that would be
admissible under the explicitness-based model. Under the dangers-based model,
a greater amount of inferentially problematic evidence would not be subject to
litigation. This setoff would, however, be negligible in comparison with the
enforcement costs that the dangers-based model will incur.
Favoring the explicitness-based model, these utilitarian concerns cannot easily
be discarded. I believe they should ultimately be trumped by the accused's con-
frontation right (both as valuable per se and as a means of reducing the risk of
erroneous conviction)."5 They seem, however, to retain their force in the civil lit-
igation context and perhaps in some other contexts as well.'"
Let me now propose another model of hearsay, which, I think, should be pre-
ferred as a matter of both form and substance. 7
IV A RISK-ALLOCATING MODEL OF HEARSAY1 8
A genuine hearsay problem may arise only when the declarant is unavailable
(or cannot be productively cross-examined as a witness) and when none of the
litigants can be blamed for keeping her out of the way. 9 In any such setting, the
disputed evidence would have to be either admitted or excluded. Preference
should therefore be given:
14. The discussion in the text draws on the general economic analysis of rules versus standards which
appears in Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
15. Born in the former Soviet Union, I happen to be an old-fashioned liberal who believes in Kantian moral-
ity and in state-power-related slippery slopes. I appreciate that other people might disagree with my attribution
of the trumping power to the confrontation right. For an insightful discussion of this issue, as related to the
implications of the Sixth Amendment upon admission of hearsay, see Margaret A. Berger, The
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76
MINN. L. REv. 557 (1992).
16. For example, in public law litigation not affecting basic individual rights. See Park, supra note 12.
17. Unlike Professor Park I do think that the law of hearsay is in grave need of reform.
18. For a full analysis see Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JuIs. (forthcoming
1996) (risk-allocating model as justifying all evidence doctrines, excluding those grounded upon policies extra-
neous to fact-finding).
19. Otherwise, the best evidence principle, as espoused by Professor Dale Nance, should exclude the disput-
ed evidence or appropriately allocate adverse inferences. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73
IowA L. REv. 227 (1988). See also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of CHUTZPA, 31 ISR.
L. REv. (forthcoming 1997) (admission of hearsay justified by the "forfeiture principle").
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(1) to the risk of admission (i.e., to the exposure of the disputed evidence's
opponent to the hearsay dangers); or,
(2) to the risk of exclusion (attendant upon the possibility that factually correct
inferences associated with the disputed evidence will be blocked); or, to the fol-
lowing risk-equalizing device:
(3) the disputed evidence should be admitted and its hearsay dangers should be
accounted for in determining its probative value.20
No other strategies are available.
Realizable through jury instructions,21 strategy (3) entails three prospects,
equiprobable in the long run of the cases:
(a) correct evaluation of the disputed evidence;
(b) its over-valuation;
(c) its under-valuation.
Risk of error would thus be faced more or less equally by both opponent and pro-
ponent of the disputed evidence.
In civil litigation, losses wrongfully sustained by plaintiffs and defendants are
generally considered to be equally harmful.22 Strategy (3) would therefore be
most suitable for civil trials.23 A fortiori, exculpatory hearsay offered by the
accused should also be admissible. Because conviction of an innocent person is
an extremely harmful error, and because any reasonable doubt should therefore
work in favor of the accused, strategy (1) would be most appropriate for this kind
of evidence. For similar reasons, strategy (2) should be followed when hearsay
evidence is offered by the prosecution against the accused.24 Application of the
hearsay doctrine would thus be confined to incriminating evidence.25 When the
doctrine is so confined, it can be applied in the form of a standard; and its appli-
cation as a standard would obviate the need to catalog the exceptional grounds
for admitting hearsay into evidence. As proposed by Professor Swift, when
hearsay evidence is highlighted by "foundation facts" in all its testimonial para-
meters (which include the declarant's perception, memory, narration, and sinceri-
ty, as related to the relevant event) this evidence ought to be admitted.2" As the
20. This is predicated on timely disclosure.
21. And in bench trials, through justification requirements.
22. See, e.g., James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil
Litigation, 18 TuLSA L.J. 79, 85 (1982); and Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof Uncertainty and Ambiguity in
Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoCY 627, 634 (1994).
23. By complicating civil litigation, admission of hearsay would incur some additional costs. At the same
time, by introducing greater ambiguity, it would increase the likelihood of a settlement when both litigants are
risk-averse.
24. In joint trials, exculpatory evidence offered by one defendant may incriminate another. This problem
should be resolved by separating the trial.
25. The same principle should apply, mutatis mutandis, in a non-criminal litigation over basic individual
ights. Cf Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (termination of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979) (involuntary commitment to a mental institution); Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276 (1966);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (denaturalization and deportation). All require "clear and
convincing evidence" as a controlling standard of proof.
26. Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1339 (1987) [hereinafter
Foundation Fact Approach]. Under this approach, evidence tendered against Alan Kearley would clearly be
inadmissible. See also Eleanor Swift, Relevance and Hearsay in Regina v. Kearley, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 75
(1995).
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required foundation fact evidence would have to be provided by cross-exam-
inable first-hand witnesses, lack of declarant's cross-examination would be reme-
died by its functionally equivalent substitute."
The risk-allocating model thus attains two important objectives:
(1) justifiable allocation of the risk of error in accordance with the sub-
stantive preferences espoused by the legal system in general; and
(2) optimal formalization of the hearsay doctrine which meets the con-
cerns of both efficiency and fairness.
This model is therefore preferable as a matter of both form and substance.28
27. Foundation FactApproach, supra note 26, at 1356-61. An identical approach has recently been advocat-
ed as a constitutionally desirable confrontation standard. See Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler,
Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation Clause,
81 VA. L. Rev. 149 (1995).
28. This complex claim is defended in Stein, supra note 18 (the format of this Comment does not allow me
to provide more than its skeleton).
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